Immigration, public opinion and the recession in Europe by Hatton, Timothy J
IMMIGRATION AND PUBLIC OPINION 
 
1 
Immigration, Public Opinion and 
the Recession in Europe 
Timothy J Hatton 
University of Essex, UK, Australian National University and CEPR 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is widely believed that in severe recessions public opinion towards immigration takes 
a sharp negative turn. When labour markets become slack, concern about competition for 
jobs intensifies. At times when public budgets come under pressure, concerns about the 
fiscal impact also increase. Little surprise, then, that politicians ramp up their anti-
immigration rhetoric in order to gain favour with voters who are shifting in that direction. 
In the UK, for example party leaders have tried to outdo each other with tougher policies 
aimed at mitigating job market competition from immigrants and limiting their access to 
social benefits. The French President and the German Chancellor have also expressed 
concerns about immigrants’ access to social security benefits. In Austria, the Netherlands 
and across Scandinavia, politicians have bowed to the increasing influence of right wing 
populist parties. The results of the 2014 European elections serve only to reinforce those 
concerns. Yet while the recession seems to have provided a justification for political 
pandering to a surge of anti-immigrant sentiment, it is far from clear how much public 
opinion has really shifted in that direction, or why.  
 This paper investigates public opinion for 20 countries using six rounds of the 
European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS has been conducted biennially from 2002 to 2012 
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and so it includes years before and after the crisis. As the crisis and the subsequent 
recession affected European countries very differently, it embraces a range of 
macroeconomic experience over the decade. The ESS data show that on average across 
Europe, the shifts in immigration opinion have been fairly modest. But the trends have 
been more negative in the countries most affected by the recession and for the responses 
to the questions that are more closely related to the economic benefit of immigration.  
The existing literature has focused on explaining differences in opinion on immigration 
across individuals according to their observable characteristics and attitudinal traits. The 
results are interpreted as reflecting economic and cultural fears and there has been a 
vigorous debate over how far these reflect individual self-interest versus wider sociotropic 
concerns. This cross-sectional literature has focused on individual-level determinants of 
opinion using variables that change only gradually over time. Despite extensive 
commentary about the overall trends in immigration opinion, the effects of economy-wide 
developments have rarely been identified. The few papers that have examined changes 
over time suggest that macro-level shocks affect opinion over broad range of individuals 
and not just among specific groups.  
In this paper I estimate regressions that include individual characteristics and that test 
for the effects of key macro-level variables on average opinion in the presence of country 
fixed effects. The results indicate that the two most influential variables shifting public 
opinion on immigration are the share of immigrants in the population and the share of 
social benefits in GDP. Higher immigrant shares tend to make opinion more negative, 
particularly for questions related to the scale of immigration. The social benefit effect 
reflects welfare state concerns and is strongly correlated with increasing budget deficits in 
those countries that have been worst hit by the recession. By contrast the unemployment 
rate matters only for responses to the question on whether immigrants are good for the 
economy. These country-level effects are not particularly large but they seem to affect 
different socioeconomic groups to much the same degree.  
These results seem to be inconsistent with the widespread view that the recession led to 
a substantial backlash against immigration and that this in turn has been a major cause of 
the resurgence across Europe of support for right wing populist parties. But there is no 
evidence of increasingly discordant opinions on immigration and, in the depths of the 
recession, the salience of immigration as a policy issue actually declined. To the extent 
that far right parties gained succour from the recession it is likely to have been for other 
reasons, notably the rising tide of Euro-scepticism.  However, as the recession recedes 
concerns over immigration may gain renewed prominence.  
 
2. TRENDS IN IMMIGRATION 
Immigration has been a source of widespread concern in recent decades. One reason is 
that in most countries it has been on the rise. Figure 1 shows total inflows and outflows of 
foreign citizens for 23 European countries since the mid-1990s. The sum of annual gross 
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inflows rose from around 1.5 million in the late 1990s to a peak of 3.6 million in 2007. 
The onset of the recession saw a sharp decline to 2009 followed by a mild upward trend. 
Gross outflows remained stable at about a million per annum and then rose to 1.5 million 
from 2009. Net immigration increased steeply from about half a million in the mid-1990s 
to 2.4 million at the peak of 2007. Thus the recession put a dent in the long run trends in 
gross and net immigration but did not return it to the levels of the mid-1990s. It is 
important to note that much of this movement is intra-European migration, which 
accounted for about two-thirds of the gross inflows. This increased with EU enlargement 
after 2004 and then declined sharply with the recession. But inflows from outside the EU 
also fell, by 12 percent between 2008 and 2012.  
 
Figure 1: Gross flows of foreigners—23 country totals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD: International Migration Database. The 23 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Rep., Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.K.   
 
For some countries the reversal was far sharper and more severe. In Ireland net 
immigration increased steeply from 2001 to the peak of 20 per thousand of the population 
2007, partly as a result of EU enlargement, and then fell sharply to become negative in 
2010. Spain also saw a steep rise in immigration, reaching 15 per thousand in 2007, then 
declining to 2 per thousand by 2010. For countries less severely affected by the recession 
the fall in net immigration was milder and in some there was almost no decline at all. In 
most countries the decline in net immigration was largely due to the gross inflow of 
foreign-born. The increase in the outflow of previous immigrants was milder and an 
increase in the emigration of nationals was marked only in the countries hardest hit by the 
recession, such as Ireland, Greece and Spain.  Free movement within the European 
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Economic Area (EEA) accounts for half of the immigration flow and this dipped sharply 
in the recession and then recovered strongly from 2010. In part this was due to movements 
from the countries most affected by the recession to those less affected, notably Germany, 
the UK, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium (OECD 2012a, pp. 18-23).1 And in 
part it was fuelled by emigration from the new accession states, Bulgaria and Romania 
(OECD 2012a, p. 44).  
There were also differences by visa class of immigrant and by destination country. 
Immigration for employment declined as governments tightened their skill shortage lists 
and temporary worker migration fell sharply before partially recovering (OECD 2012a, 
pp 101-5). Family reunification streams, which account for more than half of the inflow 
from outside the EEA, proved to be more stable and less responsive to economic 
conditions. By contrast the humanitarian stream, which had fallen steeply in the five years 
before the crisis, began to recover and it increased sharply from 2011. This was partly due 
to the rise in asylum seekers from countries affected by the events following the Arab 
Spring. Although the evidence on illegal immigration is imperfect it also suggests some 
decline in the recession. 
 
Table 1: Foreign born aged 15 and over in 2005/6 
 
Percent of 
population  
Percent 
intra-
European 
Percent 
recent 
arrivals  
Percent 
aged 15-24 
Percent 
high 
educated 
Percent 
low 
educated 
Austria 15.7 87.4 18.6 12.9 16.1 37.3 
Belgium 13.7 63.5 17.5 9.5 22.4 51.6 
Switzerland 26.6 72.4 27.3 10.5 24.3 37.5 
Czech Rep 5.6 88.3 -- 8.6 16.1 28.5 
Germany 14.4 79.5 10.2 12.4 15.7 44.0 
Denmark 8.6 54.7 27.3 17.3 21.8 26.5 
Spain 11.5 33.7 67.8 16.1 23.6 45.5 
Finland 3.7 70.2 30.9 19.4 20.7 51.8 
France 12.8 38.0 13.5 8.6 22.1 49.6 
UK 10.8 35.3 29.7 13.8 40.6 24.0 
Greece 11.2 87.7 19.3 17.7 15.1 45.2 
Ireland 16.0 77.3 50.6 18.8 38.7 24.2 
Italy 5.6 55.5 27.1 13.1 11.2 50.4 
Luxembourg 39.5 90.7 18.3 9.3 27.1 42.9 
Netherlands 11.3 36.4 11.1 11.7 20.4 35.8 
Norway 8.6 49.8 29.7 16.3 21.1 26.3 
Poland 2.6 96.3 5.0 2.5 14.0 46.6 
Portugal 6.8 28.0 21.6 15.6 19.2 53.7 
Sweden 14.5 61.2 21.9 12.5 22.3 23.3 
Source: Widmaier and Dumont (2011) p. 14. 
 
The effect of these movements on the stock of foreign-born was relatively mild overall. 
Among 23 countries the number increased from a total of 24.0 million in 2002 to 30.6 
million in 2007 and then advanced somewhat more slowly to 35.1 million in 2012. But 
there were steep increases in some countries in the five years preceding the recession. In 
                                                          
1 Bertoli et al. (2013) find that a large part of the surge in migration to Germany from southern and eastern 
Europe can be accounted for by diversion from other potential destinations.   
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Ireland, Spain, Norway and Switzerland the population share increased by more than five 
percentage points, with Belgium, the UK and Sweden not far behind. Table 1 shows that 
in 2005/6 the foreign population aged 15 and over was more than ten percent of the total 
population in 12 of the 19 countries listed (col. 1). And intra-European immigrants varied 
widely as a share of all immigrants (col. 2), from only 28 percent in Portugal to 96 percent 
in Poland. Immigration growth is reflected in the share of recent immigrants (those 
arriving in the last five years) and in the share aged 15-24 (Cols 3 and 4). Columns (5) and 
(6) of the table also show very different patterns by skill level by country, with especially 
high shares of tertiary educated in Ireland and the UK and relatively low shares in Austria, 
the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Italy and Poland. At the other end of the scale, the 
share of immigrants with low education exceeded 40 percent in more than half of the 
countries in Table 1.  
Those that departed during the recession were often the younger and more recent 
immigrants; typically the more mobile and the less well-established.  Nevertheless the rise 
in joblessness fell disproportionately on immigrants. Among 15 Western European 
countries the (unweighted) average native male unemployment rate increased from 5.3 
percent in 2008 to 9.9 percent in 2012. For foreign-born men it rose from 9.1 percent to 
16.3 percent, a differential increase of 2.5 percentage points. The burden was even more 
concentrated among recent arrivals and those with low skills. In the UK, adjusting for 
characteristics, the employment rate was 18.4 percentage points lower for non-EEA recent 
immigrants than for natives (Frattini, 2014, p. 18). In Spain similar effects were magnified 
by the severity of the recession and the prevalence of fixed term employment contracts 
(Rodríguez-Planas and Nollenberger 2014; see also Bentolila et al. 2012).  
Although the recession affected the trend in immigration to different degrees in different 
countries, the burden of adjustment fell disproportionately on immigrants. These effects 
may have served to cushion the impact of the recession on the native-born. But in severe 
recessions such outcomes provide little solace to non-immigrants and one might expect a 
policy backlash. Evidence from the past suggests that deep recessions have been the 
occasion for tougher immigration policies, ostensibly in response to the popular clamour 
for restriction. And recent press reporting certainly exhibits heightened anti-immigrant 
rhetoric. But the evidence on public opinion has been lacking. The experience of the last 
decade provides the first opportunity to comprehensively assess the effect of a deep 
recession on public opinion towards immigration.  
3. ANALYSING PUBLIC OPINION 
There is now a substantial literature analysing individual responses to a range of 
questions about immigrants and immigration. The objective has been to tease out the 
perceived economic, social and cultural threats (or opportunities) that underlie public 
opinion on immigration. Using a variety of micro-datasets, for one or many countries, 
these studies have identified some key empirical regularities (Ceobanu and Escandell 
2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Yet there remain significant differences both in 
IMMIGRATION AND PUBLIC OPINION 
 
6 
the specifications used and in the interpretations placed on the results. Almost all of this 
analysis has been cross-sectional. As a result the principal focus is on which types of 
people are against immigration rather than on how and why opinions change.  
 The most important finding in cross-sectional studies is that those with higher levels 
of education have more positive attitudes towards immigrants and are more likely to 
favour permissive immigration policies. In their study of opinion in the United States 
Scheve and Slaughter (2001) concluded that this reflects the greater labour market 
competition faced by low-skilled workers—the so-called factor proportions approach. 
Other studies support this view, finding that the education effect is stronger for workers in 
occupations that are most exposed to competition with low-skilled immigrants (Ortega 
and Polavieja 2012; Dancygier and Donnelly 2013; Malhotra et al. 2013) and for countries 
with low average skill levels (Mayda 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). An alternative 
interpretation is that those with higher levels of education are more positive about ethnic 
and cultural diversity and less intolerant towards ethnic minorities. Hainmueller and 
Hiscox (2007, 2010) argue that labour market competition is not a convincing explanation 
of the education effect because high-skilled and low-skilled natives exhibit equally 
negative opinions about low-skilled immigration.  
 Several studies focus on concerns about the fiscal costs of immigration. This could 
be related either to the threat of immigrant competition for a fixed supply of welfare 
benefits among those at the bottom of the income distribution or to the potential tax 
implications of immigration-induced expansion of the welfare budget for those further up. 
Using data for a number of countries Facchini and Mayda (2009, 2012) find that, 
controlling for education, immigration opinion is negatively related to income, reflecting 
the dominance of concerns about the tax implications of welfare dependency. This finding 
seems to conflict with the fact that the net fiscal contribution of immigrants is often found 
to be positive. Nevertheless, Boeri (2010) finds some evidence that, across European 
countries, actual and perceived fiscal burdens are correlated and that higher fiscal burdens 
are associated with more negative opinion. Similarly, looking across US States, Hanson 
et al. (2007) find that higher exposure to fiscal pressures reduces support for freer 
immigration policies, especially among college graduates.  
 A variety of studies, particularly those by political scientists, argue that social and 
cultural values are more important in shaping immigration opinion than economic 
considerations (e.g. Citrin et al. 1997; Rustenbach 2010; Manevska and Achterberg 2013). 
They focus on authoritarian and ethnocentric attitudes that translate into views that range 
from nationalism and patriotism on the one hand to racism and xenophobia on the other.2 
One recurrent finding is that attitudes are more negative towards non-white immigrants 
and those with different languages, cultures and religions. Perceived cultural concerns are 
inferred from the effects on immigration opinion of responses to questions on national 
identity and preserving national culture, attitudes towards personal safety and security, 
feelings of alienation, and positioning on the political spectrum. But unobserved 
                                                          
2 These attitudes are often linked with support for far-right populist parties (Ivarsflaten 2005; Mudde 2007, Ch. 
7; Lucassen and Lubbers 2012). 
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heterogeneity across individuals is likely to mean that such attitudinal variables will be 
endogenously correlated with opinion on immigration. Nevertheless, using latent factor 
analysis on the ESS 2002, Card et al. (2012) distinguish between concerns about jobs and 
taxes and those related to social and cultural threats. They find that social and cultural 
threats are two to five times as important as economic concerns in explaining the variation 
in immigration opinion.  
It has become increasingly clear that preferences over immigration largely reflect 
sociotropic concerns rather than individual self-interest. Thus the focus is on the social or 
economic group that the individual identifies with rather than his or her personal welfare. 
Such concerns could relate to a variety of categories: ethnicity, social class, industry, 
locality or the nation as a whole (e.g. Dustmann and Preston 2001, 2007; Ford 2011; 
Dancygier and Donnelly 2013; Malhotra et al. 2013; Markaki and Longhi 2013). Some of 
these effects might be associated with personal characteristics or other attributes, but 
others may not. Concerns about society at large or about the national economy may change 
as conditions evolve and may not be exclusive to individuals with particular 
characteristics. Some studies have examined these concerns directly by including as 
explanatory variables attitudes or expectations about the economy or society at large 
(Citrin et al. 1997; Hericourt and Spielvogel 2012). But again, such individual-level 
evaluations are likely to be endogenous. Interestingly, in experimental work, Sniderman 
et al. (2004) find that negative shocks have the effect of ‘mobilising’ opinion across a 
broad range of individuals, rather than ‘galvanising’ only those who are initially 
predisposed against immigration, (see also Rydgren 2008). In that case an economy-wide 
recession could shift opinion across-the-board—something that will be investigated 
below.   
It seems likely that macroeconomic shocks will influence average opinion on 
immigration, but the existing evidence is remarkably thin. Multi-level cross-sectional 
studies have found mixed, mainly weak and sometimes perverse results from national-
level variables (Lahav 2004; Sides and Citrin 2007; Semyonov et al. 2008; Rustenbach 
2010). The variables most often included are the share of immigrants in the population, 
the unemployment rate and GDP per capita.3 Using ESS data, Sides and Citrin (2007, p. 
477) conclude that “variation across countries in both the level and the predictors of 
opposition to immigration are mostly unrelated to contextual factors cited in previous 
research, notably the amount of immigration in to a country and the overall state of its 
economy.” But, as countries differ in a wide variety of ways, it is hardly surprising that 
such studies fail to identify these effects in the cross-section. The effects of macro-level 
variables can only be credibly identified if we focus on changes over time.4 
A number of studies have focused on the time dimension for individual countries. For 
Canada in 1987-2008 Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown (2011) found that current 
macroeconomic conditions, as reflected by the unemployment rate, dominate composition 
                                                          
3 Unemployment often gives the ‘wrong’ sign, e.g. Sides and Citrin (2007), Rustenbach (2010). 
4 Diversity in country experience is also important; using the first three waves of the ESS (preceding the financial 
crisis) Meuleman et al. (2009) obtained results consistent with, but much weaker than, those reported here.  
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and cohort effects on opinion towards immigrants. For Germany in 1980-2000, Coenders 
and Scheepers (2008) found negative effects on opinion for the unemployment rate and 
the share of non-EU immigrants, but in changes rather than in levels. Recent studies that 
span the global financial crisis, for Ireland (Denny and Ó Gráda 2013) and the United 
States (Goldstein and Peters 2014; Creighton et al. 2014), identify shifts in opinion without 
linking them to specific macro variables. These studies suggest that economy-wide 
variables might have stronger effects than can be identified in the cross-section, but such 
effects are hard to unpack for one country alone.   
4. IMMIGRATION OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY 
The data analysed here are from the European Social Survey of which there have been 
six biennial rounds from 2002 to 2012. This is a repeated cross-sectional survey, not a 
panel. The first round included a special module with a wide range of questions about 
immigration, and this has been widely analysed. Six of these questions were incorporated 
into the core survey and these have been repeated in subsequent rounds.5  The cumulative 
dataset provides a unique opportunity to analyse immigration opinion over a decade that 
spans the economic turbulence brought about by the global financial crisis. While the 
country coverage has expanded over time, not all countries are present in each round since 
first appearance. Here I select the 20 countries that are present in at least four rounds 
including at least one post-crisis round (2010 or 2012).  
Three of the six questions relate to preferences over the number of immigrants that 
should be admitted while the other three relate to the perceived impact of immigrants on 
the host country. The questions, and their categorisation, are as follows: 
 To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same ethnic group 
as most [country] people to come and live here? (many/some/a few/none). 
 How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? 
(many/some/a few/none).  
 How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe? (many/some/a few/ 
none).  
 Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come 
to live here from other countries? (range: 0 = bad  10 = good).  
 Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by 
people coming to live here from other countries? (range: 0 = undermined  10 = 
enriched).  
 Is [country] made a better or worse place to live by people coming to live here from 
other countries? (range: 0 = worse  10 = better).   
These responses are arranged as scores so that higher numbers represent more pro-
immigrant opinions. For the fourth to sixth questions the central (neutral) value is 5. The 
                                                          
5 The ESS uses face-to-face interviews. Using experiments on the ESS with alternative interview modes, Jäckle et al. 
(2010) find that telephone interviewees are on average less anti-immigration but that this the difference does not 
significantly change the coefficients of a set of explanatory variables.    
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first three questions are given values 2, 4, 6, 8, where 2 is ‘none’ and 8 is ‘many’, so that 
they have the same central value and similar variances to the other questions.  
The average scores are shown in Table 2, by country and by year, using the country-
specific weights. As is well known, across a variety of questions opinions are broadly 
neutral on average. They are slightly more negative towards admitting immigrants with 
different ethnicities or those from poorer countries than towards admitting those with the 
same ethnicity. Responses are somewhat more positive on whether or not immigrants 
enrich the culture than on whether or not they are good for the economy or for the country 
in general. Scandinavians tend be more positive about immigration than average, while 
Czech, Hungarian, Greek and Portuguese respondents are more negative.  
 
Table 2: Average opinion by country and by year 
 
More/less 
same 
ethnic grp 
More/less 
different 
ethnic grp 
More/less 
from poor 
countries 
Immigrt 
good for 
economy 
Immigrt 
enrich 
culture 
Immigrt 
better 
place 
Country (rounds)       
Belgium (6)  5.61 5.00 5.00 4.58 5.73 4.61 
Switzerland (6) 6.07 5.37 5.32 5.95 6.14 5.32 
Czech Republic (5) 4.94 4.44 4.43 4.15 4.38 4.23 
Germany (6) 6.03 5.29 5.18 5.15 5.98 4.97 
Denmark (6) 6.10 5.20 4.93 5.12 6.04 5.74 
Estonia (5) 5.61 4.58 4.02 4.56 5.15 4.32 
Spain (6) 5.18 5.04 5.04 5.30 5.90 5.02 
Finland (6) 5.42 4.78 4.59 5.32 7.13 5.45 
France (6) 5.46 5.05 4.87 4.80 5.25 4.58 
Great Britain (6) 5.26 4.86 4.70 4.53 4.95 4.56 
Greece (4) 4.76 3.77 3.71 3.49 3.45 3.18 
Hungary (6) 5.32 3.88 3.61 3.83 5.20 4.07 
Ireland (6) 5.65 5.26 5.17 5.14 5.62 5.44 
Netherlands (6) 5.40 5.17 4.98 5.04 6.08 5.03 
Norway (6) 6.00 5.43 5.40 5.58 5.90 5.15 
Poland (6) 5.87 5.51 5.55 5.13 6.41 5.69 
Portugal (6) 4.47 4.30 4.23 4.67 5.20 4.03 
Sweden (6) 6.47 6.03 6.26 5.48 7.04 6.23 
Slovenia (6) 5.50 5.15 4.92 4.26 5.12 4.53 
Slovakia(5) 5.49 5.01 5.01 4.22 5.07 4.45 
Year (no of countries)       
2002 (18) 5.47 4.97 4.99 4.84 5.72 4.74 
2004 (20) 5.47 4.90 4.81 4.68 5.49 4.71 
2006 (18) 5.58 5.00 4.91 5.04 5.75 4.93 
2008 (20) 5.56 5.01 4.88 4.93 5.65 4.91 
2010 (20) 5.52 4.92 4.73 4.70 5.40 4.77 
2012 (19) 5.61 5.12 4.91 4.97 5.80 5.08 
 
Source: European Social Survey cumulative data file rounds 1-6 (2002-12). Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data. Means calculated using 
design weights.  
 
It is possible that the responses to survey questionnaires underestimate the overall degree 
of negativity towards immigrants if respondents give what they believe to be the 
‘politically correct’ answer to a question rather than to reveal their true sentiment.  Funk 
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(2013) provides interesting evidence from post-referendum surveys in Switzerland. On 
referenda aiming to restrict immigration the mean ‘yes’ vote was five percentage points 
higher than the mean of the subsequent survey. A significant share of the bias was due to 
ex-post knowledge of the outcome of the vote, but differences in truthfulness also depend 
on individual values, as reflected by religion, culture and socioeconomic position. While 
such biases may affect the overall levels they are much less likely to affect comparisons 
over time, provided that the identical question is asked. The lower panel of Table 2 shows 
the evolution in average opinions across the six rounds of the ESS. Overall they changed 
only modestly in the wake of the global financial crisis. But the mean scores on all the 
questions falls between 2008 and 2010, and not just for the question on the economy, 
before recovering strongly in 2012.  
 
5. IMMIGRATION OPINION ACROSS INDIVIDUALS AND PERIODS 
In order to assess macro-level effects on immigration opinion I use a model that can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡𝛼 + 𝑍𝑐𝑡𝛽 + 𝑑𝑡 +  𝑢𝑐 + 𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡      (1) 
 
Where Yict is the score for a particular opinion question where subscript i is individual, 
c is country and t is year.  Xict represents a set of individual characteristics and Zct is a set 
of country-level variables with coefficient vectors α and β respectively. dt is a set of period 
dummies, uc is a set of country fixed effects and eict is an idiosyncratic error term. In 
equation (1) the dependent variable, Y, is simply the score for each variable as described 
earlier. X includes just a few variables that are standard in the literature but it excludes 
other attitudinal variables, which are likely to be endogenous.  
To focus first on the individual characteristics, Table 3 presents regressions that exclude 
the macro-level variables, Z. Age is included in quadratic form to allow for possible non-
linearity. As Table 3 shows, the linear term is generally negative with varying magnitudes, 
while squared term is positive except in col (5). In Cols (1) and (3), where both terms are 
significant, opinion becomes more negative throughout the age range but at a decreasing 
rate. The gender effects vary considerably across the questions with the strongest positive 
effect among males in response to the question whether immigration is good for the 
economy. Being born in the country has a large negative effect, indicating that immigrants 
are more pro-immigration, while being a member of an ethnic minority has an additional 
positive effect. Being in the labor force (employed or unemployed) has a negative effect, 
that is significant in the first four columns, which would be consistent with concerns about 
job market competition. But it could also imply that earners are more concerned than non-
earners about the tax implications of immigration.  
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Table 3: Correlates of opinion across individuals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 More/less 
same 
ethnic grp 
More/less
different 
ethnic grp 
More/less
from poor 
countries 
Immigrt 
good for 
economy 
Immigrt 
enrich 
culture 
Immigrt 
better 
place 
Age   -0.012** 
  (6.03) 
  -0.014** 
  (6.88) 
  -0.017** 
  (8.53) 
  -0.008** 
  (2.82) 
   0.001 
  (0.21) 
  -0.010** 
  (4.28) 
Age 
squared/100 
   0.004** 
  (2.16) 
   0.002 
  (0.95) 
   0.004** 
  (2.14) 
   0.004 
  (1.38) 
  -0.011** 
  (3.97) 
   0.002 
  (0.77) 
Male    0.057** 
  (4.36) 
   0.026* 
  (1.74) 
  -0.014 
  (0.97) 
   0.287** 
(17.62) 
  -0.048** 
  (2.08) 
   0.040** 
  (2.14) 
Born in country   -0.338** 
(10.23) 
  -0.366** 
(10.30) 
  -0.334** 
  (9.56) 
  -0.791** 
(13.42) 
  -0.720** 
 (13.12) 
  -0.847** 
(16.20) 
Ethnic minority 
 
   0.080** 
  (3.06) 
   0.187** 
  (7.45) 
   0.209** 
  (7.94) 
   0.291** 
  (6.40) 
   0.355** 
  (7.15) 
   0.368** 
  (8.90) 
Labour force 
participant 
  -0.029** 
  (2.07) 
  -0.030** 
  (2.53) 
  -0.029** 
  (2.38) 
  -0.056** 
  (3.25) 
  -0.024 
  (1.42) 
  -0.004 
  (0.26) 
High education    0.785** 
(38.27) 
   0.766** 
(34.61) 
   0.632** 
(28.83) 
   1.212** 
(39.90) 
   1.162** 
(31.65) 
   0.949** 
(26.49) 
Mid-level 
education 
   0.300** 
(18.11) 
   0.294** 
(17.09) 
   0.211** 
(12.30) 
   0.439** 
 (19.43) 
   0.455** 
(21.05) 
   0.350** 
(16.15) 
High education 
*participant 
   0.053** 
  (2.69) 
   0.156** 
  (7.95) 
   0.135** 
  (6.68) 
   0.170** 
  (5.52) 
   0.202** 
  (6.86) 
   0.146** 
  (4.99) 
Year 2002   -0.094 
  (1.58) 
  -0.061 
  (1.25) 
   0.078 
  (1.51) 
  -0.069 
  (1.07) 
   0.054 
  (1.06) 
  -0.180** 
  (3.14) 
Year 2004   -0.058 
  (0.98) 
  -0.072 
  (1.38) 
  -0.038 
  (0.63) 
   0.017* 
  (1.82) 
  -0.076 
   (1.20) 
  -0.140** 
  (2.39) 
Year 2006   -0.063 
  (1.17) 
  -0.110** 
  (2.33) 
  -0.070 
  (1.37) 
   0.014 
  (0.18) 
  -0.083 
  (1.40) 
  -0.101* 
  (1.73) 
Year 2010   -0.018 
  (0.31) 
  -0.056 
  (1.22) 
  -0.102** 
  (2.12) 
  -0.171** 
  (2.28) 
-0.164** 
  (3.01) 
  -0.090 
  (1.55) 
Year 2012   -0.005 
  (0.07) 
   0.043 
  (0.75) 
  -0.013 
  (0.21) 
 -0.026 
  (0.32) 
   0.025 
  (0.41) 
   0.075 
  (1.18) 
R2    0.125    0.162    0.164    0.123    0.171    0.148 
F-stat  180.95  300.51  225.29  210.83  195.35  127.36 
Country/years       115       115       115       115       115       115 
Observations 205164 205000 204664 202606 202970 202581 
Notes: OLS regressions; country dummies included; design weights used. ‘t’ statistics in parentheses 
computed from standard errors clustered by country/year; significance levels: ** 5%, * 10%. 
 
High education (completed tertiary education) has a strong positive effect while mid-
level education (upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary) has a smaller positive 
effect. Consistent with other studies, education is among the most important correlates of 
differences in immigration opinion, and the effects are large relative to those of other 
variables. The interaction between labor market participation and high education is 
positive. This could also be interpreted as a labour market competition effect. Conditional 
on being in the labour market, the more educated the worker the less he or she would fear 
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competition from low-skilled immigrants. Perhaps the most striking feature of these 
results overall is how similar the pattern of coefficients on personal characteristics is 
across the range of different questions. In part this reflects the relatively high correlations 
across individuals in the scores for different questions.6 The largest differences are in 
column (4) relating to the economy and column (5) relating to the influence on the 
society’s culture, but even those differences are mainly in the effects of age and gender.  
The year dummies capture common period effects relative to 2008. These show that the 
trends are modest with a few significant deviations. There is very little trend but with a 
mild dip in 2006 for the question on different ethnicities and in 2010 for the question on 
immigrants from poor countries. Columns (4) and (5) also provide some evidence of a 
negative turn in opinion in 2010 but with some recovery by 2012. For the question on 
whether immigration makes the country a better place to live the period dummies in 
column (6) show an upward trend with comparatively little change in the recession. 
Overall, the common period effects are modest, but they mask differences between 
countries that may reflect the diversity in experience at the macro-level over the decade 
that spans the crisis and recession.  
This diversity is illustrated in Figure 2 for the question on whether immigrants are good 
for the economy.  These are the unconditional means for each year as deviations from the 
overall country mean. The gap between the gridlines is one unit of the dependent variable, 
that is, one point on a scale of 0 to 10. The “North” group of countries exhibit mild trends, 
with a slight rise from 2004 to 2006 in and then a further uptick after 2010 in Estonia, 
Finland and Norway and the opposite in Sweden. Not surprisingly, the “South” countries 
exhibit greater fluctuation with substantial post-crisis declines in Spain, Greece, Portugal, 
and from 2006, in Ireland. In the “East” group there is considerable diversity with a 
shallow “U” shape in Hungary, a rise from 2004 to 2006 in Poland and some downward 
trend after 2006 in Slovakia. Finally in “Middle” Europe the trends are again fairly mild 
with a slight rise from 2004 to 2006, except for Britain. In Germany there is a distinct 
upward trend from 2004 with a pause in 2010.  
 
 
 
                                                          
6 The correlations among the first three questions range from 0.65 to 0.80 and among the second three questions from 0.62 to 
0.69. Correlations between questions in the first and second three are somewhat lower, ranging from 0.44 to 0.53.  
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Figure 2: Unconditional trends: Immigrants Good for the Economy 
  
  
2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 8 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 2
"NORTH"
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
Norway
Sweden
2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 8 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 2
"SOUTH"
Spain
France
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 8 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 2
"EAST"
Czech Rep.
Hungary
Poland
Slovenia
Slovakia
2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 8 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 2
"MIDDLE"
Belgium
Switzerland
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
IMMIGRATION AND PUBLIC OPINION 
 
14 
6. NATIONAL EFFECTS ON IMMIGRATION OPINION 
I explore the influence of macroeconomic variables by estimating equation (1) where Z 
is represented by five alternative economy-wide variables. The data sources are listed in 
the appendix. In Table 4, each row reports the coefficient when just one macro-level 
variable (for the survey year) is entered in a regression with individual characteristics, 
country fixed effects and year dummies (not reported). The first row shows that the 
percentage of foreign born in the population has a negative effect on opinion.  This effect 
is present for all the different questions, although it is not significant in the last column.  
The coefficients are modest in size but they are more significant than the effects that have 
often been found in studies that rely on cross-country variation. The second row shows 
the effect of the unemployment rate, which again is more strongly negative than is 
typically found in cross-sectional studies. Moving from column (1) to column (3) the 
coefficient increases in size and significance. Not surprisingly it is much larger for the 
question on whether immigrants are good for the economy in column (4) than for the 
question on the effect of immigration on the country’s cultural life in column (5).    
 
Table 4: The effects of national-level indicators on opinion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 More/less 
same 
ethnic grp 
More/less
different 
ethnic grp 
More/less
from poor 
countries 
Immigrt 
good for 
economy 
Immigrt 
enrich 
culture 
Immigrt 
better 
place 
Foreign-born 
(%) 
  -0.088** 
  (5.58) 
  -0.049** 
  (2.83) 
  -0.051** 
  (3.03) 
  -0.068** 
   (2.32) 
  -0.041** 
  (2.27) 
   -0.027 
  (1.22) 
R2 within    0.129    0.163    0.165    0.124   0.171    0.148 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
  -0.018 
  (1.60) 
  -0.021** 
  (2.18) 
  -0.026** 
  (2.45) 
  -0.061** 
   (5.21) 
   0.003 
  (0.34) 
  -0.022** 
  (2.62) 
R2 within    0.126    0.163    0.165    0.126    0.171    0.145 
Social benefits  
% of GDP 
  -0.045** 
  (3.09) 
  -0.050** 
  (4.77) 
  -0.058** 
   (5.08) 
  -0.119** 
  (6.37) 
  -0.028** 
  (2.25) 
  -0.058** 
  (4.90) 
R2 within    0.127    0.164    0.166    0.127   0.171    0.150 
Budget deficit 
% of GDP 
  -0.024** 
  (5.02) 
  -0.017** 
  (4.66) 
  -0.018** 
  (4.45) 
  -0.045** 
  (5.36) 
  -0.014** 
  (3.81) 
  -0.020** 
  (5.67) 
R2 within    0.128    0.163    0.165    0.126    0.171    0.150 
Log GDP per 
capita 
   0.493 
  (0.93) 
   0.349 
  (0.65) 
   0.509 
  (0.87) 
   1.720** 
  (2.42) 
   0.116 
  (0.22) 
   0.421 
  (0.79) 
R2 within    0.126    0.162    0.164    0.123    0.171    0.148 
Notes: Each panel reports coefficients from regressions that include the all the variables reported in 
Table 3 with country fixed effects. OLS regressions; design weights used. ‘t’ statistics in parentheses 
are computed from standard errors clustered by country/year; significance levels: ** 5%, * 10%.  
 
IMMIGRATION AND PUBLIC OPINION 
 
15 
The third row of Table 4 shows the effects of the share of social benefits (cash and in-
kind) in GDP, which reflects concerns about the fiscal effects of immigration.7  These 
effects are more significant than those for unemployment; the coefficients are negative in 
all six columns, and especially so for column (4), relating to the economy. This is 
consistent with research showing that perceptions of negative economic and moral 
consequences of the welfare state are correlated across countries with social expenditure 
per capita (Van Oorschot et al. 2012).  But it may also reflect the importance of concerns 
about the tax implications of welfare spending and perhaps broader concerns about the 
state of the public finances. The effect of the central government’s budget deficit is 
examined in the fourth row. Here the pattern is similar to that for social benefits although 
the coefficients are smaller in size. It is possible that the apparent effects of the government 
budget simply reflect concerns about the recession more generally, i.e. the denominator of 
the budget ratios rather than in the numerator. The fifth row indicates that this is not the 
case. The coefficients on the log of real GDP per capita are insignificant for all the 
questions except for whether immigration is good for the economy.  
Table 5 reports three sets of regressions, each with three macro-level explanatory 
variables; as before individual characteristics and year dummies are included but not 
reported. Because social benefits and the budget deficit are highly correlated they are not 
combined in one regression8. In the upper panel the coefficient on the foreign-born 
percentage remains negative and significant in four of the six columns but the coefficient 
on the unemployment rate becomes small and insignificant except in column (4) relating 
to the economy.  By contrast the share of social benefits in GDP remains negative and 
strongly significant for each of the questions on opinion. The middle panel shows the 
results when the unemployment rate is replaced by the long-term unemployment rate in 
order to capture the cumulative labour market effects of the recession. This produces 
results very similar to those for the overall unemployment rate. In the lower panel the 
budget deficit is included in place of social benefits. As with the middle panel the fiscal 
indicator is significantly negative across all six questions. Thus public spending, 
particularly spending on social welfare, influences all aspects of opinion towards 
immigration. However the magnitude of the effect is fairly modest; social benefits to GDP 
rose on average by about 2 percentage points over the recession and this damped opinion 
by at most 0.2 points on the 11-point scale. The population share of immigrants matters 
most for responses to the questions in the first three columns, those that more closely 
related to policy, while unemployment matters only for opinion on whether immigration 
is good for the economy.  
 
 
 
                                                          
7 See OECD (2012b) for a discussion of recent trends in social expenditure across the OECD.  
8 Taking the two variables as residuals from regressions with country fixed effects and year dummies, the 
correlation coefficient is 0.7. 
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Table 5: Multivariate national-level effects on immigration opinion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 More/less 
same 
ethnic grp 
More/less
different 
ethnic grp 
More/less
from poor 
countries 
Immigrt 
good for 
economy 
Immigrt 
enrich 
culture 
Immigrt 
better 
place 
Foreign born 
(%) 
  -0.082** 
  (5.71) 
  -0.038** 
  (2.48) 
  -0.037** 
  (2.71) 
  -0.030 
  (1.44) 
  -0.041** 
  (2.17) 
  -0.011 
  (0.56) 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
   0.005 
  (0.51) 
  -0.002 
  (0.17) 
  -0.005 
  (0.47) 
  -0.026** 
  (2.70) 
  0.014 
  (1.51) 
  -0.004 
  (0.42) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP 
  -0.036** 
  (2.91) 
  -0.042** 
  (3.92) 
  -0.047** 
  (4.39) 
  -0.089** 
  (4.91)           
  -0.033** 
 (2.41) 
  -0.052** 
  (3.65) 
R2 within    0.130    0.165    0.167    0.128    0.171    0.150 
Foreign born 
(%) 
  -0.083** 
  (5.69) 
  -0.039** 
  (2.57) 
  -0.037** 
  (2.78) 
  -0.033 
  (1.57) 
  -0.041** 
  (2.19) 
  -0.013 
  (0.64) 
Long-term 
Unemp rate (%) 
   0.011 
  (0.72) 
   0.001 
  (0.08) 
  -0.004 
  (0.24) 
  -0.030** 
  (2.02) 
   0.022 
  (1.55) 
  -0.000 
  (0.00) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP 
  -0.037** 
  (3.23) 
  -0.044** 
  (4.12) 
  -0.050** 
  (4.67) 
  -0.100** 
  (5.43) 
  -0.032** 
  (2.32) 
  -0.055** 
  (3.89) 
R2 within    0.130    0.165    0.167   0.128    0.171    0.150 
Foreign born 
(%) 
  -0.073** 
  (4.99) 
  -0.033* 
  (1.90) 
  -0.032** 
  (2.05) 
  -0.011 
  (0.48) 
  -0.034* 
  (1.70) 
  -0.002 
  (0.07) 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
  -0.001 
  (0.05) 
  -0.011 
  (1.21) 
  -0.016 
  (1.58) 
  -0.043** 
  (4.15) 
   0.008 
  (0.84) 
  -0.014 
  (1.53) 
Budget deficit  
% of GDP 
  -0.014** 
  (3.45) 
  -0.009** 
  (2.48) 
  -0.010** 
  (2.62) 
  -0.032** 
  (4.65) 
  -0.012** 
  (2.83) 
  -0.016** 
  (3.83) 
R2 within    0.130    0.164    0.166   0.128    0.171     0.149 
Notes: Each panel reports coefficients from regressions that include the all the variables reported in 
Table 3 and country dummies. OLS regressions; design weights used. ‘t’ statistics in parentheses 
computed from standard errors clustered by country/year; significance levels: ** 5%, * 10%.  
 
 
It is possible that concerns about social expenditure differ according to the type of 
expenditure. The first panel of Table 6 includes the percentage of social benefits that is 
represented by cash transfers, where the unemployment rate has now been dropped. The 
main effect of social benefits remains negative and significant, except for the question 
relating to the effect of immigration on the country’s cultural life.  Thus there is some 
evidence that the share of cash transfers in social expenditure matters, perhaps because 
this component increased most sharply during the recession. The cash share gives 
significantly negative coefficients in columns (2) and (3) that relate to immigrants of 
different ethnicities and from poor countries and also in columns (4) and (6) that relate to 
the economy and the country as a whole.  
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Table 6: Multivariate national-level effects on immigration opinion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 More/less 
same 
ethnic grp 
More/less
different 
ethnic grp 
More/less
from poor 
countries 
Immigrt 
good for 
economy 
Immigrt 
enrich 
culture 
Immigrt 
better 
place 
Foreign born 
(%) 
  -0.078** 
  (5.52) 
  0.035** 
  (2.32) 
  -0.035** 
  (2.61) 
  -0.034 
  (1.65) 
-0.036* 
(1.92) 
  -0.009 
  (0.48) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP  
  -0.024** 
  (1.98) 
  -0.028** 
  (2.77) 
  -0.035** 
  (3.64) 
  -0.081** 
  (4.99) 
-0.022 
(1.65) 
  -0.038** 
  (2.87) 
Cash % of 
social benefits 
  -0.013 
  (1.41) 
  -0.025** 
  (3.81) 
  -0.026** 
  (3.47) 
  -0.051** 
  (4.59) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
 -0.028**       
  (2.91) 
R2 within    0.130    0.165    0.168    0.129 0.171    0.150 
Foreign born 
(%) 
  -0.077** 
  (5.34) 
  -0.037** 
  (2.40) 
  -0.036** 
  (2.49) 
  -0.040* 
  (1.96) 
  -0.036* 
  (1.92) 
  -0.013 
  (0.67) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP  
  -0.027** 
  (2.45) 
  -0.041** 
  (3.65) 
  -0.047** 
  (4.16) 
  -0.113** 
  (6.33) 
  -0.021 
  (0.59) 
  -0.056** 
  (4.10) 
Social benefits 
% *fiscal 
impact 
  -0.048** 
  (3.04) 
  -0.021 
  (1.02) 
  -0.040* 
  (1.97) 
   0.009 
  (0.38) 
  -0.003 
  (0.13) 
   0.004 
  (0.18) 
R2 within    0.131    0.165    0.167    0.128    0.171    0.150 
Foreign born 
(%) 
  -0.082** 
  (4.13) 
  -0.047** 
  (2.57) 
  -0.053** 
  (3.26) 
  -0.049* 
  (1.90) 
  -0.053** 
  (2.52) 
  -0.034* 
  (1.70) 
Foreign born * 
share non-
western  
   0.010 
  (0.17) 
   0.043 
  (0.95) 
   0.071 
  (1.60) 
   0.045 
  (0.92) 
   0.083* 
  (1.96) 
   0.106** 
  (2.79) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP  
  -0.032** 
  (3.11) 
  -0.045** 
  (4.28) 
  -0.054** 
  (5.04) 
  -0.113** 
  (6.12) 
  -0.024* 
  (1.86) 
  -0.059** 
  (4.48) 
R2 within    0.130    0.164   0.167    0.128   0.172    0.150 
Notes: Each panel reports coefficients from regressions that include the all the variables reported in 
Table 3 and country dummies. OLS regressions; design weights used. ‘t’ statistics in parentheses 
computed from standard errors clustered by country/year; significance levels: ** 5%, * 10%.  
 
One might expect that fiscal concerns would be greater where the net fiscal contribution 
of immigrants was more negative, even if these effects are imperfectly perceived. In order 
to test this hypothesis I use the difference between immigrants and non-immigrants in the 
ratio of fiscal benefits to contributions as estimated by the OECD for 2007-9 (OECD, 
2013, Table 3 A4). As this variable is available only for one year and it is interacted with 
the ratio of social benefits to GDP. The interaction effect should be negative if fiscal 
concerns are greater the more negative is the net fiscal contribution of immigrants as 
compared with natives. The middle panel of Table 6 shows that the main effect of social 
benefits remains negative and significant except in column (5), relating to effects on the 
culture. The interaction effect also takes a negative coefficient but the coefficient is only 
significant in columns (1) and (3). Although the interaction has somewhat stronger effects 
for the first three questions that relate to immigration policy it has no effect at all for the 
question on whether immigrants are good for the economy.  
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Finally, it is often argued that opinion is shaped by immigrants from non-western 
countries rather than by the total immigrant stock (Dustmann and Preston 2007; Schneider 
2008). Unfortunately there is no comprehensive annual series for the non-western share. 
Instead I take from the 2000-1 round of censuses the share of all immigrants that was born 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America. This is interacted with the percentage of all immigrants 
in the population. If non-western immigrants are the focus then the interaction should be 
negative and the main effect should diminish in size and significance. But as lower panel 
of Table 6 shows, the main effect remains significant in each of the six equations whereas 
the coefficient on the interaction is positive and insignificant except in the last two 
columns. It is notable that even in columns (2) and (3), which relate to immigrants with 
different ethnicities and those from poor countries, there is no evidence that the immigrant 
stock effect is stronger in countries were the non-western share is larger. Thus, even 
though individual preferences clearly differ across different migrant sources, changes over 
time are driven by the total immigrant stock.   
One question that arises is whether the influence of macro-level variables relies on just 
one or a few countries that are outliers compared with the rest. As illustrated in Figure 2, 
the shifts in opinion across the decade look rather different between countries and country 
groups. Table 7 provides regressions for four groups of five countries focusing on the 
effects of the percentage foreign born and the share of social benefits in GDP. These 
regressions are for the country groups in Figure 2 and so the number of country/years is 
reduced to between 28 and 30. Because there are so few macro observations in each 
regression the significance of individual coefficients is inevitably reduced, not least 
because the recession was relatively mild in some parts of Europe compared with others.  
The results indicate that the share of social benefits has a discernible effect in all country 
groups. It gives a consistently negative and significant effect in all groups for the question 
on the economy and also for South, East and Middle Europe for the questions on more/less 
immigrants from different ethnic groups and from poor countries. For the share of 
immigrants in the population the effects are negative and significant for all questions for 
the countries of Middle Europe, negative but not always significant for North Europe, and 
negative but insignificant for East Europe. The only country group where the signs are not 
consistently negative is in the South where the coefficients are insignificant except for the 
question on whether immigration makes the country a better place to live. With this 
exception the coefficients suggest that concerns about social expenditures and the share of 
immigrants had some influence on opinion across Europe, notwithstanding the small 
number of country/year observations in each group. This serves to underline the 
importance of including countries with a diversity of macroeconomic experience in order 
to assess more precisely the effects of macro shocks on shifts in opinion over time.   
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Table 7: National-level effects on immigration opinion by country group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 More/less 
same 
ethnic grp 
More/less
different 
ethnic grp 
More/less
from poor 
countries 
Immigrt 
good for 
economy 
Immigrt 
enrich 
culture 
Immigrt 
better 
place 
   North    
Foreign born 
(%) 
 -0.087** 
 (4.27) 
 -0.037 
 (1.59) 
 -0.035* 
 (1.96) 
 -0.051 
 (1.37) 
 -0.154** 
 (4.06) 
 -0.051 
 (1.30) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP  
 -0.022 
 (1.26) 
  0.001 
 (0.01) 
 -0.023* 
 (1.69) 
 -0.067** 
 (3.00) 
 -0.030 
 (1.30) 
 -0.033 
 (1.51) 
R2 within   0.115   0.211   0.249   0.095   0.174   0.147 
Country/years       29       29        29        29        29        29 
   South    
Foreign born 
(%) 
 -0.102** 
 (7.06) 
 -0.001 
 (0.05) 
  0.001 
 (0.07) 
  0.009 
 (0.43) 
   0.030 
  (1.55) 
  0.054** 
 (2.80) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP  
 -0.006 
 (0.25) 
 -0.075** 
 (3.26) 
 -0.088** 
 (3.79) 
 -0.162** 
 (4.34) 
 -0.122** 
  (3.97) 
-0.110** 
 (3.97) 
R2 within   0.130   0.172   0.158   0.156    0.178   0.184 
Country/years        28        28        28        28         28        28 
   East    
Foreign born 
(%) 
 -0.038 
 (1.48) 
 -0.005 
 (0.27) 
 -0.019 
 (1.03) 
 -0.007 
 (0.34) 
 -0.018 
 (1.14) 
 -0.009 
 (0.51) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP  
 -0.035 
 (0.91) 
 -0.100** 
 (3.90) 
 -0.105** 
  (3.69) 
 -0.179** 
 (4.97) 
 -0.079** 
 (2.43) 
 -0.121** 
 (3.59) 
R2 within   0.074   0.172   0.168   0.079   0.115   0.105 
Country/years        28        28        28        28        28        28 
   Middle    
Foreign born 
(%) 
 -0.146** 
 (5.52) 
 -0.166** 
 (6.96) 
 -0.171** 
 (5.59) 
 -0.150** 
 (3.58) 
-0.100** 
(3.50) 
 -0.127** 
 (3.71) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP  
 -0.068** 
 (4.52) 
 -0.034** 
 (2.23) 
 -0.048** 
 (2.38) 
 -0.065** 
 (2.21) 
 0.007 
(0.38) 
 -0.017 
 (0.80) 
R2 within  0.107   0.096   0.087   0.126  0.116   0.092 
Country/years       30        30        30        30       30        30 
Notes: Each panel reports coefficients from regressions that include the all the variables reported in 
Table 3 and country fixed effects. OLS regressions; design weights used. ‘t’ statistics in parentheses 
computed from standard errors clustered by country/year; significance levels: ** 5%, * 10%.  
 
7. HETEROGENIETY ACROSS SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS 
The results so far indicate that fiscal concerns about welfare spending are at the heart of 
population-wide shifts in immigration opinion, and for policy-related questions so is the 
share of immigrants in the population. But these macro-level effects might differ 
considerably across different types of people. As Table 2 showed, individual 
characteristics matter at the micro level and these may affect the way in which different 
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individuals respond to macro-level shocks. In order to test for these effects the macro 
variables are interacted with individual characteristics. In order to keep the focus on 
changes over time the interactions are taken as deviations from country means. As shown 
by Ozer Balli and Sørensen (2013) interactions may otherwise be vulnerable to capturing 
misspecification.9 The equation to be estimated is therefore: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡𝛼 + 𝑍𝑐𝑡𝛽 + (𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 − ?̅?𝑐)(𝑍𝑐𝑡 − ?̅?𝑐)𝛾 +  𝑑𝑡 +  𝑢𝑐𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡  (2) 
 
where ?̅?𝑐and ?̅?𝑐are the country means of the respective variables. This specification also 
has the advantage of preserving the estimate of the main effect as well as providing a direct 
test of the interaction as a deviation from the mean effect.  
The effect of macro variables might be expected to differ across education groups as 
education variables are among the most significant in the cross section. If the more highly 
educated have more liberal and perhaps longer term perspectives, or if they feel less 
threatened by immigration, then their opinions might be less responsive to the recession. 
The regressions in Table 8 include period dummies and country fixed effects but also 
include interactions between macro variables and education groups, where the excluded 
group is low education. The upper panel shows the main effects which are essentially the 
same as those in the upper panel of Table 5.  
The middle panel of Table 8 shows the interactions of macro-level variables with high 
education (complete tertiary). The F-tests (reported in the first row of Table 9) show that, 
taken together, the interactions are only jointly significant for equation (4).The interactions 
of high educated with the percentage foreign-born and the share of social benefits in GDP 
are uniformly insignificant. But there are clear differences in the coefficients on 
unemployment, which are positive and significant in columns (2), (3), (4) and (6). To the 
extent that unemployment negatively affects opinion for low skill groups there is an 
offsetting positive effect for the high educated, even though the main effect is only 
significant for the question on whether immigration is good for the economy. In the latter 
case unemployment has a negligible overall effect on opinion among the high educated. 
This may be because the high educated are less at risk from labour market competition. 
Interactions with the middle education group (completed upper secondary or post-
secondary non-tertiary) are shown in the lower panel of Table 8. These effects are 
uniformly insignificant except in column (4) where there is an additional negative effect 
on opinion stemming from the share of social benefits in GDP, which is significant at the 
10 percent level. This suggests that perhaps fiscal concerns are greatest for the middle 
education group.  
 
 
                                                          
9 Ozer Balli and Sørensen (2013) show that this is especially the case where there may be heterogeneity in the slope coefficients 
across the cross sectional observations (e.g. in the coefficients on individual characteristics for different countries) or omitted 
variables (e.g. for the macro-level indicators).  
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Table 8: National-level interaction effects by education group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 More/less 
same 
ethnic grp 
More/less
different 
ethnic grp 
More/less
from poor 
countries 
Immigrt 
good for 
economy 
Immigrt 
enrich 
culture 
Immigrt 
better 
place 
Foreign born 
(%) 
  -0.082** 
  (5.73) 
  -0.038** 
  (2.49) 
  -0.037** 
  (2.71) 
  -0.030 
  (1.44) 
  -0.041** 
  (2.17) 
  -0.011 
  (0.55) 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
   0.005 
  (0.52) 
  -0.002 
  (0.18) 
  -0.005 
  (0.47) 
  -0.027** 
  (2.70) 
   0.014 
  (1.49) 
  -0.004 
  (0.46) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP 
  -0.036** 
  (2.91) 
  -0.042** 
  (3.90) 
  -0.047** 
  (4.37) 
  -0.089** 
  (4.88) 
  -0.033** 
  (2.38) 
  -0.052** 
  (3.61) 
 Interactions with high education 
Foreign born 
(%) 
  -0.012 
  (0.84) 
  -0.011 
  (0.89) 
  -0.007 
  (0.56) 
  0.020 
  (0.88) 
   0.013 
  (0.57) 
  0.014 
  (0.69) 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
   0.015 
  (1.38) 
   0.021** 
  (2.27) 
   0.020** 
  (2.14) 
  0.038** 
  (3.23) 
   0.021 
  (1.42) 
  0.033** 
  (2.08) 
Social benefits   
% of GDP 
   0.009 
  (0.57) 
  -0.002 
  (0.15) 
   0.004 
  (0.38) 
  -0.026 
  (1.41) 
  -0.008 
  (0.32) 
 -0.019 
  (0.80) 
 Interactions with middle education 
Foreign born 
(%) 
  -0.004 
  (0.44) 
  -0.000 
  (0.07) 
  -0.001 
  (0.13) 
   0.009 
  (0.58) 
   0.001 
  (0.04) 
   0.000 
  (0.01) 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
  -0.001 
  (0.13) 
   0.001 
  (0.02) 
  -0.000 
  (0.00) 
   0.007 
  (0.87) 
   0.005 
  (0.57) 
  -0.010 
  (1.17) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP 
  0.004 
  (0.22) 
  -0.000 
  (0.02) 
   0.009 
  (1.02) 
  -0.025 
  (1.97)* 
  -0.007 
  (0.54) 
  -0.015 
  (1.04) 
R2     0.130    0.165    0.167    0.129    0.171    0.150 
Notes: This table reports OLS coefficients from regressions that include the all the variables reported 
in Table 3 and country dummies. OLS regressions; design weights used. ‘t’ statistics in parentheses 
computed from standard errors clustered by country/year; significance levels: ** 5%, * 10%.  
 
It might be thought that the opinions of younger people would be more influenced by 
the recession than older people whose opinions are more likely to have been set by past 
experience.10  Also, the young might be more concerned with unemployment while older 
respondents are more concerned with social benefits. Alternatively, as job finding rates 
are lower among older workers, they may be more concerned about the threat of 
unemployment. Interactions between age and the same three macro variables were 
estimated and the results are shown in appendix Table A1.  The coefficients proved to be 
generally insignificant and this is reflected in the F-tests for their joint significance in the 
second row of Table 9. A similar procedure was adopted for men versus women (Table 
A1) and, as the third row of Table 9 shows, these were also jointly insignificant.  Among 
the possible group-wise differences in response to the recession one might expect the 
strongest to be between ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority population. The fourth 
                                                          
10 However Duffy and Frere-Smith (2014) find for the UK that those born before 1965 became more negative 
towards immigration over the last decade (see also Ford 2011; Calahorrano, 2013). 
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panel of Table 9 shows that these too are jointly insignificant with the exception at the 
10% level for the question on whether immigrants are good for the economy. One might 
also expect that there would be differences in the response to the recession between those 
in the labour force and non-participants. However the test statistics in the fourth panel of 
Table 9 show that the coefficients on the interactions are jointly insignificant, with the 
exception of the question on the economy and that on the benefit to the country as a whole.  
Thus, although there is a little evidence of differences by education group in responses to 
aggregate variables, there are few significant differences across age, sex, labour force 
participation and ethnic minority status. 
 
Table 9: Tests for the joint significance of interaction effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 More/less 
same 
ethnic grp 
More/less
different 
ethnic grp 
More/less
from poor 
countries 
Immigrt 
good for 
economy 
Immigrt 
enrich 
culture 
Immigrt 
better 
place 
 Interactions with three education groups 
F (6, 114) 
P-value 
    1.09 
    0.38 
    1.33 
    0.25 
    1.57 
    0.16 
    3.15** 
    0.01 
    1.06 
    0.37 
    1.44 
    0.20 
 Interactions with age 
F (3, 114) 
P-value 
    0.33  
    0.82 
    1.12 
    0.35 
    1.20 
    0.31 
    1.58 
    0.20 
    1.06 
    0.37 
    0.81 
    0.49 
 Interactions with gender 
F (3, 114) 
P-value 
    0.56 
    0.65 
    0.09 
    0.95 
    0.13 
    0.94 
    1.01 
    0.39 
    0.53 
    0.67 
    0.31 
    0.82 
 Interactions with ethnic minority status 
F (3, 114) 
P-value 
    0.40 
    0.75 
    1.52 
    0.21 
    0.55 
    0.65 
    2.57* 
    0.06 
    1.70 
    0.17 
    1.47 
    0.23 
 Interactions with labour force participation 
F (3, 114) 
P-value 
    0.87 
    0.46 
    0.98 
    0.40 
    1.57 
    0.20 
    2.35* 
    0.08 
    0.99 
    0.40 
    2.43* 
    0.07 
Notes: Joint tests of significance for the interactions reported in Table 8 and Table A1 in the 
Appendix.  
 
The preceding tests apply to all individuals, and although only marginal differences were 
found between labour market participants and non-participants, it is worth focusing 
specifically on those in the labour market. As noted above, a number of studies have found 
that the perceived ‘threat’ of immigration differs widely across segments of the labour 
market. If so, then the rise in unemployment might elicit more negative responses among 
those most exposed to immigrant competition. In order to test this hypothesis I interact the 
three macro variables with the share of foreign born in the individual’s labour market 
segment.  
One approach is to define labour market segments by education and years of experience, 
following Borjas (2003). There has been a lively debate about the impact of immigration 
across education/experience groups, with mixed results (Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; 
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Manacorda et al., 2012).  Experience is measured as age minus years of education minus 
five, and this is divided into five experience groups: 0-5, 6-10, 11-20, 21-30, and > 30. 
The three education levels are high middle and low education as previously defined and 
so there are fifteen education/experience groups. The share of immigrants in each of these 
groups is calculated over the entire ESS dataset (20 countries by six rounds), in order to 
ensure sufficient numbers.  The results appear in the upper panel of Table 10 where, as 
before, individual characteristics, period dummies and country fixed effects are included 
but not reported. Although only labour market participants are included, the main effects 
are very similar to those reported for all individuals (e.g. in the upper panel of Table 5). 
The percentage foreign born is negative and significant for the responses to the first three 
questions relating to more or less immigrants and the share of social benefits in GDP is 
negative and significant for all six questions. By contrast the interactions are largely 
insignificant. The interactions with unemployment do not yield consistently negative 
coefficients, as would have been expected if opinion was more responsive to rising 
unemployment among those facing greater labour market competition. Indeed, the 
coefficients on the interaction are all positive but significant only for the question on 
whether immigration is good for the economy.  
An alternative approach is to define labour market segments by occupation. Several 
studies have found evidence of negative effects on opinion of immigrant competition 
within occupational or industrial segments (Ortega and Polavieja 2012; Dancygier and 
Donnelly 2013; Malhotra et al. 2013). In these studies, however, that the negative effects 
are from cross sectional estimates, they are not differential responses to macro shocks. The 
occupational classification in the ESS is based on the international standard ISCO88 (see 
appendix Table A2). The share of immigrants is calculated for each of 27 two-digit 
occupations groups. Across these classes the immigrant share varies from 3 percent to 16 
percent. The results of interacting the macro variables with the share of immigrants in the 
individual’s own occupational group are presented in the lower panel of Table 10.  Here 
the number of observations is somewhat reduced as some occupations could not be 
classified at the two digit level. As in the upper panel, the main effects are consistent with 
those found when non-participants are included. But the coefficients on the interactions 
are all insignificant and hence the response to macroeconomic shocks does not appear to 
differ according to the immigrant-intensity of the individual’s occupational group.  
To sum up, there seems to be relatively little variation in the responses to economy-wide 
shocks across different types of individual. This contrasts sharply with the cross sectional 
results where opinions are found to vary according to individual characteristics and labour 
market position. There is some evidence of differences in the effects of macro variables 
across education groups, especially in the effect of unemployment. But overall the 
differential responses to macro shocks are modest. This is consistent with the literature 
noted above which suggests that such shocks tend to be ‘mobilising’ across all groups 
rather than ‘galvanising’ those who are predisposed against immigration. 
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Table10: Interactions with immigrant share in own skill group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 More/less 
same 
ethnic grp 
More/less
different 
ethnic grp 
More/less
from poor 
countries 
Immigrt 
good for 
economy 
Immigrt 
enrich 
culture 
Immigrt 
better 
place 
Foreign born 
(%) 
  -0.081** 
  (5.62) 
  -0.042** 
  (2.50) 
  -0.042** 
  (2.75) 
  -0.031 
  (1.40) 
  -0.037* 
  (1.80) 
  -0.009 
  (0.41) 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
   0.007 
  (0.68) 
   0.001 
  (0.06) 
  -0.004 
  (0.34) 
  -0.019* 
  (1.97) 
   0.017* 
  (1.78) 
   0.001 
  (0.11) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP 
  -0.035** 
  (3.17) 
  -0.038** 
  (3.48) 
  -0.041** 
  (3.59) 
  -0.093** 
  (5.03) 
  -0.028** 
  (2.00) 
  -0.055** 
  (3.84) 
Foreign born 
(%)*Imm share 
   0.007 
  (0.04) 
  -0.019 
  (0.10) 
  -0.063 
  (0.32) 
 -0.398 
  (1.36) 
   0.374 
  (1.07) 
 -0.360 
  (1.38) 
Unemp. rate 
(%)*Imm share 
   0.097 
  (0.65) 
   0.024 
  (0.24) 
   0.192 
  (1.43) 
  0.340** 
  (2.16) 
   0.181 
  (0.95) 
  0.086 
  (0.52) 
Social benefits   
% *Imm share 
  -0.201 
  (0.99) 
  -0.046 
  (0.21) 
  -0.179 
  (0.88) 
  -0.147 
  (0.45) 
  -0.278 
  (0.74) 
 -0.151 
  (0.51) 
R2 within    0.125    0.155    0.158    0.133    0.172    0.152 
F (interactions)    0.50    0.04    0.73    2.24     1.23    0.71 
p-value    0.69    0.99    0.54    0.09     0.30    0.55 
No obs.  119118 119099 118975 118762 119033 118411 
Foreign born 
(%) 
  -0.081** 
  (5.51) 
  -0.041** 
  (2.33) 
  -0.040** 
  (2.57) 
  -0.030 
  (1.31) 
  -0.031 
  (1.54) 
  -0.004 
  (0.18) 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
   0.009 
  (1.05) 
  -0.000 
  (0.03) 
  -0.004 
  (0.43) 
  -0.017* 
  (1.66) 
   0.016 
  (1.57) 
  -0.001 
  (0.09) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP 
  -0.042** 
  (4.38) 
  -0.039** 
  (3.46) 
  -0.042** 
  (3.50) 
  -0.097** 
  (4.93) 
  -0.027* 
  (1.85) 
  -0.055** 
  (3.81) 
Foreign born 
(%)*Imm share 
  -0.005 
  (0.02) 
  -0.136 
  (0.84) 
  -0.253 
  (1.51) 
  0.038 
  (0.11) 
  -0.024 
  (0.07) 
   0.114 
  (0.45) 
Unemp. rate 
(%)*Imm share 
  -0.031 
  (0.21) 
   0.023 
  (0.17) 
  -0.068 
  (0.51) 
  -0.117 
  (0.53) 
   0.043 
  (0.20) 
   0.110 
  (0.64) 
Social benefits  
%*Imm share 
  -0.032 
  (0.14) 
  -0.064 
  (0.33) 
  -0.114 
  (0.62) 
  -0.041 
  (0.11) 
  -0.315 
  (0.80) 
  -0.364 
  (1.13) 
R2 within    0.125    0.157    0.160    0.133    0.175   0.154 
F (interactions)          0.08    0.62    1.15    0.12    0.71   0.47 
P-value    0.97    0.61    0.33    0.95    0.55   0.70 
No obs. 103660 103619 103534 103203 103556 103008 
Notes: This table reports OLS coefficients from regressions that include the all the variables reported 
in Table 3 and country dummies. OLS regressions; design weights used. ‘t’ statistics in parentheses 
computed from standard errors clustered by country/year; significance levels: ** 5%, * 10%.  
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8. PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL TRENDS 
As noted in the introduction, European governments have toughened their rhetoric on 
immigration in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. And it is sometimes suggested 
that anti-immigrant sentiment is at the heart of the recent electoral gains made by far right-
wing parties. Indeed, anti-immigrant policies are the single most dominant theme among 
far-right populist parties as a number of studies have shown (Kessler and Freeman, 2005; 
Ivarsflaten 2008). Across Europe support for such parties increased but with diffrences 
between countries in both levels and trends (see Box 1). Yet, as we have seen, the rise in 
anti-immigrant sentiment has been modest overall, even though it has been more marked 
in the countries that suffered most in the recession. A number of hypotheses may be 
invoked to explain these seemingly dissonant trends.  
One possibility is that there has been a growing divergence in opinion. This could 
account for growing support for far right parties despite only modest change in average 
opinion.  Although the recession had similar effects on different demographic groups this 
may mask growing discordance within groups. If so then one might expect the dispersion 
of opinion to have increased. Table 11 shows the average of within-country standard 
deviations of immigration opinion. The results indicate that any increase in dispersion 
from 2008 was very small. Indeed the largest increases occur between 2002 and 2004, pre-
dating the recession. Regressions of country-level standard deviations on year dummies 
(not shown) did not reveal significant coefficients for the years 2010 and 2012. Similar 
results were found when controlling for the three key variables, the immigrant stock, the 
unemployment rate and the share of social benefits in GDP.  
 
Table 11: Standard deviation of opinion by year (average of countries) 
Year (No. of 
countries) 
More/less 
same 
ethnic grp 
More/less 
different 
ethnic grp 
More/less 
from poor 
countries 
Immigrt 
good for 
economy 
Immigrt 
enrich 
culture 
Immigrt 
better 
place 
2002 (18) 1.52 1.55 1.54 2.24 2.26 2.05 
2004 (20) 1.65 1.68 1.68 2.32 2.36 2.15 
2006 (18) 1.62 1.67 1.68 2.32 2.34 2.13 
2008 (20) 1.60 1.63 1.66 2.25 2.31 2.11 
2010 (20) 1.64 1.64 1.67 2.22 2.27 2.07 
2012 (19) 1.60 1.65 1.70 2.32 2.34 2.17 
 
Source: European Social Survey cumulative data file rounds 1-6 (2002-12). Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data. These figures are the 
averages of within-country standard deviations.  
 
A second possibility is that the salience of immigration increased. Salience is the degree 
to which individuals think that a particular issue is pressing or important. Issues that gain 
a high profile in the press and in popular debate are likely to take greater weight in the 
preferences of voters between party platforms, even though the underlying attitudes have 
not changed very much.  Studies in political science suggest that salience is a necessary 
condition for an issue to become a major focus of  political debate, which then influences 
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or shapes party platforms (Givens and Luedtke 2004; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 
2007). It is possible, then, that immigration became more salient in the recession, even 
though the shift in average opinion is modest. 
It is not possible to examine this issue with the ESS as there are no questions on the 
priorities placed by respondents on different political issues. An alternative is the 
Eurobarometer surveys of public opinion. The relevant question is “What do you think are 
the most important issues facing (our country) at the moment?” Respondents are asked to 
state the two most important issues that concern them. An average of the responses for 14 
European countries is displayed in Figure 3, which compares the salience of immigration 
with that of another policy issue, the economic situation. The countries are the EU-15 with 
the exception of Luxembourg and the responses are from the autumn round of 
Eurobarometer.  
 
Figure 3: Salience of immigration and the economic situation (14 countries) 
 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/  
 
As Figure 3 shows, the proportion of respondents listing immigration as one of the two 
most important issues increased from 12 percent in 2003 to nearly 20 percent in late 2006. 
As the global financial crisis broke the salience of immigration dropped back to 10 percent 
in 2008. After a brief revival in 2010 it declined further before rising again after 2012. By 
contrast, and not surprisingly, concerns about the economic situation loom larger.  They 
were declining to 2007, and then jumped sharply in prominence to nearly 40 percent in 
2008. Salience of the economy continued to rise up to 2011 before falling back close to 
the level of 2003. During the recession the salience of immigration might have been 
expected to increase, but it was crowded out by concerns about the recession itself.  So 
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while public opinion on immigration became somewhat more negative in the recession, 
its salience declined and so it registered less as a key policy issue, not more.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BOX 1: THE POPULARITY OF THE FAR RIGHT 
 
The surge in popularity of populist right-wing parties has been a cause for concern in 
recent years. The table below shows the share of votes received by some of these 
parties in the elections to the European Parliament in 2004, 2009 and 2014. It includes 
only countries that are included the dataset analysed here and those that received at 
least five percent of the vote in any one of the elections.  The picture is somewhat 
mixed. In countries such as Germany, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (not in the table), 
such parties are small and have remained so. In some countries there was a surge of 
support between 2004 and 2009 (Denmark, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands) while 
in some (Denmark, France, Greece, Sweden) it came between 2009 and 2014. 
  
Vote Share of Populist Right-wing parties in European Parliament Elections. 
Country Parties 2004 2009 2014 
Belgium Flemish Interest (VB) 14.3 9.9 4.3 
Denmark  Danish Peoples Party (DFP) 6.8 15.3 26.6 
Finland True Finns (PS) 0.5 9.8 12.9 
France National Front (FN) 9.8 6.3 24.9 
Great 
Britain 
British National Party (BNP); UK Independence 
Party (UKIP) 
20.4 22.8 28.6 
Greece Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS); Golden Dawn 
(XA) 
4.7 7.2 12.1 
Hungary Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP); 
Jobbik (JMM) 
2.4 14.8 14.7 
Netherlands List Pim Fortuyn (LPF); List Geert Wilders 
(PVV) 
2.6 17.0 13.3 
Sweden Sweden Democrats (SD) 0.0 3.3 9.7 
Slovenia Slovene National Party (SNS). 5.0 2.9 4.0 
Note: Vote shares taken from European Election Database and 
www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/elections_results/review.pdf.  
 
These parties share some core elements rooted in nationalism and xenophobia. 
Though they differ in other ways, anti-immigration and euroscepticism is at the heart 
of their appeal. While the great recession has exacerbated discontent with the EU, 
Figure 3 suggests that the pendulum is now swinging back towards anti-immigration 
as the recession fades and immigration increases. Changes in party leadership and 
orientation are also important. Perhaps the best example is the French National Front, 
where Marine Le Pen has broadened the party’s appeal and distanced it from the neo-
Nazi stance of her father, former leader Marie Le Pen.   
Parallels are sometimes drawn with the rise of far-right parties in the 1930s, at a time 
when immigration was lower, even though ethnic differences were intensified. 
Examining 28 countries in the 1920s and 1930s De Bromhead et al (2013) find that 
the Great Depression significantly increased the vote share of right-wing anti-system 
parties, and the more so the longer it persisted. While the parallels are far from exact, 
the notion that a prolonged recession shores up support for the extreme right and 
sometimes increases it, is broadly consistent with the experience of the last decade.   
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Recent studies for periods that pre-date the recession have shown that surges in support 
for right-wing populism are associated with growing immigrant numbers.  In districts of 
Hamburg increases in immigration led to a rising vote share for the far right Republikaner 
Party in 1987 to 1997 (Otto and Steinhardt, 2014) and immigration fuelled the rise of the 
Freedom Party of Austria in the 1980s and 1990s (Halla et al., 2013). Yet immigration 
grew more slowly after the recession that began in 2008 and, although opinion on 
immigration became somewhat more negative, its salience declined. Thus the recent surge 
in right wing populism seems not to have ridden principally on a wave of ant-immigrant 
sentiment but on something else. This observation is reinforced by the fact that much of 
the resurgence in right wing populism has been in northern Europe, notably in 
Scandinavia, and predominantly in the countries least severely affected by the recession.  
Anti-immigration may be an important part of far right populism but it is not the only 
ingredient. As political scientists have shown, right wing populism appeals not only to 
those with nationalistic or xenophobic attitudes but also to those with anti-establishment 
views and strong distrust of political institutions, which is reflected most sharply in euro-
scepticism (Arzheimer, 2009). Analysing ESS data up to 2008 Werts et al. (2014) find 
that, in terms of the broad traits linked with far right voting, euro-scepticism comes third 
after perceived ethnic threat and anti-establishment sentiment. Other evidence suggests 
that that core support for the EU, which was already weakening, has diminished sharply 
during the recession (Armigeon and Ceka 2014). It therefore seems likely that euro-
scepticism has become a more important driver of right wing populism since the economic 
crisis. The elections to the European Parliament support that view, as the growth in support 
for far right populists has generally been greater in European than in national elections. In 
part those gains have been hastened or facilitated by the evolution of right wing populism 
itself in countries, such as the UK, France and the Netherlands, where the trend has been 
away from an extreme racist or neo-Nazi stance towards a broader nationalist appeal (Bos 
and van der Brug 2010).  
It is worth briefly exploring the trends in some dimensions of opinion that are widely 
associated with right wing populism. Here I focus on six questions from the ESS:    
 In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right"….where would you place 
yourself on this scale? (0 = left  10 = right). 
Please tell me….how much you personally trust....  
 Politicians (0 = no trust  10 = complete trust).  
 Political parties (0 = no trust  10 = complete trust).  
 [Country]'s parliament (0 = no trust  10 = complete trust).  
 European Parliament (0 = no trust  10 = complete trust).  
 Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go 
further. Others say it has already gone too far. What number on the scale best 
describes your position? (0 = too far  10 = go further). 
These trends are illustrated in Table 14 where shifts in relevant ESS responses are 
examined with period dummies in regressions that include all the individual characteristics 
used for immigration opinion and country fixed effects. The first column shows that, as 
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compared with 2008 there is some evidence of a shift towards individual self-placement 
to the right, not in 2010, but certainly by 2012. By contrast, columns (2) to (4) show the 
trust in domestic politics and politicians declined sharply in 2010 and then recovered, at 
least to some degree.  In part that may be because in most countries the government that 
was in power when the crisis broke lost the subsequent election (see Harteveld et al., 
2014). This contrasts with the results in columns (5) and (6) which relate to trust in 
European institutions. Trust in the European Parliament declined steeply after the global 
financial crisis and this effect persisted through to 2012. And although the question on 
European unification was not asked in 2002 and 2010, the significant negative coefficient 
for 2012 provides additional evidence that anti-EU sentiment was more persistent than 
resentment against national governments.11  
 
Table 14: Period effects on political attitudes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Self-
placement 
on left-
right scale  
Trust in 
politicians  
Trust in 
political 
parties 
Trust in 
national 
parlia-
ment 
Trust in 
European 
Parlia-
ment 
European 
unific-
ation go 
further 
2002   -0.002 
  (0.04) 
   0.254** 
  (2.82) 
    --    0.299** 
  (2.49) 
   0.120 
  (1.03) 
    -- 
2004    0.001 
  (0.03) 
  -0.000 
   (0.00) 
  -0.005 
  (0.05) 
  -0.021 
  (0.18) 
  -0.053 
  (0.36) 
   0.205** 
  (2.79) 
2006    0.037 
  (1.21) 
   0.043 
  (0.51) 
   0.041 
  (0.52) 
   0.072 
  (0.68) 
   0.045 
  (0.55) 
  -0.004 
  (0.57) 
2010    0.052 
  (1.16) 
  -0.202* 
  (1.81) 
  -0.225** 
  (2.39) 
  -0.283** 
  (2.02) 
  -0.352** 
  (2.56) 
    -- 
2012    0.087** 
  (2.47) 
  -0.113 
  (1.04) 
  -0.148 
  (1.45) 
  -0.200 
  (1.51) 
  -0.344** 
  (3.34) 
  -0.234** 
  (2.64) 
R2 within    0.029   0.170    0.188   0.163    0.063    0.061 
Observations 192704 214889 180491 212871 195545 134714 
Notes: Coefficients from regressions that include the all the variables reported in Table 3 and country 
dummies. OLS regressions; design weights used. ‘t’ statistics in parentheses computed from 
standard errors clustered by country/year; significance levels: ** 5%, * 10%. The question on trust 
in political parties (col. 3) was not asked in 2002 and that on European unification (col. 6) was not 
asked in 2002 or 2010.  
 
The regressions presented in Table 14 are circumstantial only. But the timing of the 
surge in right wing populism and its distribution across countries does not fit very well 
with the trends (or lack thereof) in anti-immigrant opinion. So why is there a widespread 
belief that this is at the heart of the successes of the far right? In the first few years of the 
recession the salience of immigration as a political issue was eclipsed by economic 
concerns brought on by the crisis. But the Euro crisis and the prolonged recession has 
                                                          
11 These results are consistent with the findings of Papaioannou (2013) who finds, using the ESS up to 2010, that the initial fall 
in trust was greater for national governments than for the EU. Exploiting regional differences in Russia Ananyev and Guriev 
(2014) confirm the presence of a causal link between the recession and trust.  
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incubated euro-scepticism upon which far-right parties have capitalised. And the growing 
prominence in the media of these parties has also given added impetus in the political 
debate to other issues on the far-right agenda—most notably immigration.   
 
9. CONCLUSION 
This paper has explored the links between opinion on immigration and the macro-level 
variables that are often believed to influence it. This is important for two reasons. One is 
that there have been few convincing attempts to measure such effects. The magnitude of 
the recent recession and its widely varying impact across countries provides a unique 
opportunity to evaluate them. The other is that, in the context of the recent policy debate, 
some commentators have drawn strong conclusions about how and why opinion has 
shifted in recent years. These often seem to be based on media-driven rhetoric rather than 
on the results of research.  
Perhaps the most striking finding that emerges from the analysis of six rounds of the 
ESS is that opinion on immigration has changed modestly since before the recession. In 
part this is due to the fact that the recession itself has been comparatively mild in some 
countries, and in part it is because macroeconomic conditions have had relatively small 
effects on average opinion.  The dip in 2010, which was most marked in the countries that 
suffered the deepest recessions, was largely recovered by 2012. This is consistent with the 
findings of cross-sectional analyses that stress the importance of individual-level variables 
like education and demography—variables that shift only slowly over time.  
The key influences on average opinion are the percentage of foreign-born in the 
population and the share of social benefits in GDP. Once these are taken into account the 
unemployment rate has very little effect. These findings resonate with the focus of recent 
political debate and also with the academic debate where the emphasis has shifted from 
labour market effects to the fiscal effects of immigration. But the result may be specific to 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis in which rising welfare spending and budget 
deficits have gone hand in hand. Although the coefficients are modest in size the impact 
is substantial for those countries worst hit by the recession. Between 2006 and 2010 the 
effect of the increase in social expenditure on responses to the question on whether 
immigrants are good for the economy was -0.78 points in Ireland, -0.54 in Spain and -0.42 
in Greece (on the scale of 0 to 10).  
It is possible that immigration opinion will become more favourable as fiscal conditions 
improve and the share of welfare spending falls although its salience is on the increase. 
But the recent surge in support for such populist parties, particularly in Northwest Europe 
has been more to do with their euro-sceptic and anti-bailout platforms than with their anti-
immigration policies. The political discord sown by the recession, and the perceived 
failures of economic management, undermined the public’s faith in politicians and 
governments, at least for a while. By contrast the weakening of trust in Europeans 
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institutions and in support for European unification has been more persistent as the Euro 
crisis has dragged on.  
From the tone of political debate one might think that in order to head off further gains 
by right wing populists across Europe national governments should clamp down hard on 
immigration in order to assuage the anger of voters who, in the face of recession, have 
swung decisively against immigration. The results presented here suggest that, for the 
most part, shifts to the right have not ridden on an upsurge of anti-immigrant sentiment. 
While anti-immigration is a core feature of far right policies, the change since 2008 has 
been in other dimensions of the far right agenda—discontent with existing political 
institutions and most importantly with the EU. In order to win back disaffected voters 
politicians need to focus on rebuilding trust in political institutions rather than directing 
their fire at immigrants. 
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Table A1: Interaction effects by age, sex, labour force status and ethnicity (main 
effects not reported) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 More/less 
same 
ethnic grp 
More/less
different 
ethnic grp 
More/less
from poor 
countries 
Immigrt 
good for 
economy 
Immigrt 
enrich 
culture 
Immigrt 
better 
place 
 Interactions with age 
Foreign born 
(%) 
   0.025 
  (0.66) 
   0.004 
  (1.14) 
   0.023 
  (0.64) 
   0.003 
  (0.05) 
   0.056 
  (1.00) 
   0.039 
  (0.75) 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
  -0.017 
  (0.58) 
  -0.040 
  (1.41) 
  -0.034 
  (1.39) 
  -0.068* 
  (1.83) 
  -0.047 
  (1.43) 
  -0.050 
  (1.41) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP 
   0.008 
  (0.17) 
   0.003 
  (0.07) 
  -0.018 
  (0.43) 
   0.008 
  (0.13) 
   0.016 
  (0.29) 
   0.025 
  (0.40) 
R2     0.13    0.16    0.17    0.13    0.17    0.15 
 Interactions with gender 
Foreign born 
(%) 
  -0.008 
   (0.91) 
  -0.001 
  (0.17) 
  -0.006 
  (0.61) 
  -0.006 
  (0.61) 
   0.016 
  (1.03) 
  -0.001 
  (0.08) 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
   0.005 
  (0.87) 
  -0.003 
  (0.46) 
  -0.002 
  (0.22) 
  -0.006 
  (0.72) 
  -0.004 
  (0.37) 
  -0.008 
  (0.84) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP 
   0.000 
  (0.03) 
   0.005 
  (0.47) 
   0.006 
  (0.48) 
  -0.010 
  (0.81) 
  -0.006 
  (0.37) 
   0.000 
  (0.03) 
R2    0.13    0.16    0.16    0.13    0.17    0.15 
 Interactions with ethnic minority status 
Foreign born 
(%) 
  -0.016 
  (0.70) 
  -0.010 
  (0.41) 
   0.001 
  (0.04) 
  -0.045 
  (1.04) 
  -0.044 
  (1.15) 
  -0.041 
  (1.17) 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
  -0.011 
  (0.58) 
  -0.013 
  (0.73) 
  -0.002 
  (0.11) 
  -0.023 
  (0.66) 
  -0.021 
  (0.69) 
   0.017 
  (0.58) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP 
   0.007 
  (0.31) 
  -0.010 
  (0.39) 
  -0.017 
  (0.66) 
   0.012 
  (0.23) 
   0.014 
  (0.27) 
  -0.001 
  (0.02) 
R2    0.13    0.16    0.17    0.13    0.17    0.15 
 Interactions with labour force participation 
Foreign born 
(%) 
  -0.009 
  (0.98) 
  -0.007 
  (1.00) 
  -0.012 
  (1.55) 
   0.006 
  (0.54) 
   0.006 
  (0.69) 
   0.005 
  (0.54) 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
   0.006 
  (1.16) 
   0.008 
  (1.48) 
   0.004 
  (0.76) 
   0.018** 
  (2.55) 
   0.012 
  (1.62) 
   0.016 
  (2.65) 
Social benefits  
% of GDP 
  -0.003 
  (0.27) 
  -0.002 
  (0.28) 
   0.008 
  (1.14) 
  -0.016 
  (1.47) 
  -0.008 
  (0.81) 
  -0.016 
  (1.48) 
R2    0.13    0.16    0.17    0.13    0.17    0.15 
Note: This table reports OLS coefficients from regressions that include the all the variables reported 
in Table 3 and country dummies. Main effects of the three macro-level variables are also included 
but not reported. OLS regressions; design weights used. ‘t’ statistics in parentheses computed from 
standard errors clustered by country/year; significance levels: ** 5%, * 10%.  Coefficients in the 
upper panel are multiplied by 100.   
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Table A2: Data sources and definitions 
ESS data 
The data is taken from the cumulative dataset for the six rounds of the ESS 2002-2012. 
These are obtained from Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive 
and distributor of ESS data. Opinion and attitudinal variables and defined in the text; the 
personal characteristics used as explanatory variables are defined in the following table. 
For the first five rounds occupations are classified according to ISCO88; for round 6 
ISCO08 is used. Occupational codes for round 6 were converted to ISCO08 with the help 
of Benjamin Beuster (ESS support) using the conversion derived by Harry Ganzeboom.   
 
Variable ESS definition 
Age AGEA: Age calculated in years. 
Sex GNDR: Sex. 
Born in country BRNCNTR: Born in country. 
Ethnic minority BLGETMG: Belong to an ethnic minority group. 
Labour force participant PDWRK: Paid work in last 7 days, or UEMPLA: Unemployed and 
actively looking for a job in last 7 days.  
Education EDULVLA: Highest level of education completed. Divided into 
three education groups: High (Tertiary education completed—
ISCED 5-6), Middle (Upper secondary or post-secondary non-
tertiary—ISCED 3-4), Low (All other—ISCED 0-2 and not 
classified).  
Occupation 27 occupations groups at the ISCO88 2-digit level. Those that could 
be classified only at the one-digit level were dropped.   
 
National-level variables 
Data Series Source/definition 
Foreign born percentage of 
population. 
OECD, International Migration Outlook 2013, Table A.4: Stocks of 
foreign-born population in OECD countries and the Russian 
Federation.  
Unemployment percentage OECD: Harmonised unemployment rate all persons (average of 
monthly rates).  
Social benefits percentage 
of GDP 
OECD:  Social benefits and social transfers in kind (series 
D62_D63PS13S) – Percentage of GDP.  
Budget deficit percentage of 
GDP 
OECD: Net lending/net borrowing - General government - 
Percentage of GDP (series B9S13S). 
GDP per capita OECD: GDP Per head, US $, constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD 
base year (series HVPVOB).  
Fiscal impact OECD International Migration Outlook, 2013, Table 3 A4: Ratio of 
fiscal benefits to contributions; immigrants minus natives. 
Non-western immigrant 
share of all foreign-born 
OECD:  Migration Database:  Immigrants by citizenship and age. 
For 2001; non-western = Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
 
) 
